

Resistance Against Dutch Colonialism in Kluet 1925-1927

Anzalimuddin Anzalimuddin¹, Mawardi Umar¹, T. Bahagia Kesuma*¹

*t.bahagiakesuma@usk.ac.id

¹Universitas Syiah Kuala

Abstract

After the capture of Sultan Aceh Muhammad Daud Syah in 1903, resistance against the Dutch had begun to subside, so several views emerged that the Aceh war against the Dutch had ended. The study's objectives are the background and reasons for the emergence of new resistance in 1925 and the resistance strategy against the Dutch Colonial in Kluet in 1925-1927. To achieve these objectives, this study uses a historical method. It is known that the resistance in Kluet was caused by various factors, namely, Dutch arbitrariness in development projects, revenge, Dutch interference in the Kluet customary government, and religious factors. The fighters' strategy in carrying out resistance was a guerrilla warfare strategy. The emergence of resistance against the Dutch in the Kluet region only occurred in 1925-1927 when other areas were calm, which was motivated by two things, namely Dutch intervention in the Kluet regional government with the signing of the Pledge Letter in 1925 which caused chaos among the keujreun, uleebalang, uleebalang Potong, village heads and civilians. In addition, it was also motivated by mental problems, namely, the views of the fighters, who previously considered resistance against the Dutch impossible, suddenly changed after seeing the T.R. Angkasah group protesting against the Dutch. This action ignited the spirit of the fighter groups to dare to resist consistently.

Keywords

Dutch Colonialism, Kluet People, Struggle

To cite this article

Anzalimuddin, A., Umar, M., Kesuma, T.B. (2024). Resistance Against Dutch Colonialism in Kluet 1925-1927. *Diakronika* 24(2), 78-91.
<http://doi.org/10.24036/diakronika/vol24-iss2/343>.

Received 23 February 2023
Revised 24 Desember 2024
Accepted 28 Desember 2024
pp. 78-91



Introduction

This article is based on the Aceh War against the Dutch Colonial, one of the largest and longest wars experienced by the Dutch Colonial in the Dutch East Indies. The number of victims in the Dutch war in Aceh for just ten years, from 1899-1909, reached 21,865 Acehnese people. That figure was almost 4% of the total population at that time. In 1914, this figure rose to 23,198 people, and it is calculated that all casualties (from Aceh and the Netherlands) during that period were almost the same as those who fell during the war of 1873 - 1899. Not to mention the victims who fell from 1914 to 1942. The number of These victims becomes an illustration of how terrible the war was (Hermaliza, 2014). The war continued until the 20th century, but it is still debatable when the Aceh War against the Dutch ended. There are several opinions regarding the end of the Aceh War. J. Kreemer believes that the Aceh War ended in 1910, and John Sydenham Furnivall gave another opinion. According to him, the Aceh War ended in 1904. Meanwhile, Jan Jongejans believes that the Aceh War ended between 1910-1913, which is in line with the death of the Tiro cleric. Ibrahim Alfian set the limit for the end of the Aceh War in 1912 after the weapons workshop of Teungku Di Tiro. The Dutch seized it close by Bunga, Pidie. Apart from that, the cleric Teungku Di Barat, who had appeared prominently in the arena of war since 1903, died along with his wife in a battle in the same year (Alfian, 1987).

However, unlike Ibrahim Alfian, Paul Van 't Veer, a well-known Dutch writer, expressed his view that the Aceh-Dutch War only ended in 1942. In line with Paul Van't Veer's opinion, between 1925 and 1927, a resistance movement emerged. Against the Dutch in South Aceh, especially in the Kluet area and its surroundings, this was unique because, in other regions, physical resistance to the Dutch had practically begun to subside. This resistance series was commanded by Teuku Raja Angkasah, Teuku Cut Ali, and Panglimo Rajo Lelo (Veer, 1985). The discourse regarding when the Aceh-Dutch War ended will always be enjoyable, regardless of whether it is considered a war or just an *opstand*, namely the armed resistance of part of the population against foreign pressure, which he previously acknowledged. There was still resistance in the Kluet area during the 1925-1927. Starting from this problem, this article will comprehensively review the resistance that occurred in Kluet in the period 1925-1927 both in terms of the factors that led to the emergence of resistance, the series of resistance that happened, new reasons for the emergence of resistance when other areas had begun to subside and also strategies. Strategies used by fighters in carrying out resistance. It is hoped that the article will impact the existence of struggle figures in the Kluet area so that they will be remembered now and in the future. Considering that there is not much literature on research into the local history of Kluet, this article can be a breakthrough in looking at the history of Kluet.

Research Methods

This article uses a qualitative approach. The qualitative approach aims to holistically understand the phenomena experienced by research subjects, for example, behavior, perceptions, motivations, actions, etc., holistically and by describing them in the form of words and language in a scientific context and by using scientific methods (Moleong, 2017). This article aims to reconstruct the past, so the historical method used is descriptive analysis. The stages in historical research itself are: (1) selecting a topic, (2) heuristics or collecting sources, (3) verifying or criticizing sources, (4) interpreting sources, and (5) historiography or rewriting historical events (Kuntowijoyo, 2018).

At the topic selection stage, two things need to be considered, namely emotional closeness and intellectual closeness. Emotional closeness refers to the connection or bond between individuals and research topics related to feelings, emotions, and intimacy. Meanwhile, intellectual closeness is associated with the similarity of interests, understanding, and philosophical views between individuals and the research topic (Kuntowijoyo, 2018). The many Aceh history books tend to be more about the struggle against the Dutch colonialists in Kutaraja and Tiro, even though resistance against the Dutch also occurred in many places in Aceh, one of which was in Kluet. Research and writing on the history of the independence struggle must continue to be developed so that the services and existence of these struggle figures are remembered now and in the future. There is a lack of literature on local history research in Kluet, so research into colonial history in Kluet is essential.

The second stage is heuristics, or the data collection process. This article uses two techniques in data collection, namely documentation study and literature study. Collecting data through techniques and documents (documentation study) is a way of collecting data through archives left behind. It includes books of opinions, theories, postulates, laws, and other documents related to research problems (Iryana

& Kawasati, 2019). Literature study can be interpreted as a series of activities related to collecting library data, reading and taking notes, and processing research materials. The library is used because it collects many necessary books. Literature review materials can be taken from various sources such as research journals, dissertations, theses, research reports, textbooks, papers, seminar reports, scientific discussions, official government publications, and other relevant institutions (Zed, 2014).

The sources obtained are divided into two types of historical sources. The first is primary sources. Primary sources themselves can be interpreted as evidence that is contemporaneous with an event that occurred. Primary data can be oral or written, and Dutch archives can be in reports or newspapers (Sjamsuddin, 2016). Primary sources in this article include *Laporan Politik Gubernemen Aceh dan Daerah Takluknya Selama Tahun 1926-1927*, Dutch records about the landscape of their residential area such as *Militaire Nota Over de Onderafdeling Tapatoean* dan *Nota van het Landschap Kloeet en van het Landschap Troemon*. Apart from these notes, this article also uses Dutch newspaper sources that contain news of resistance events in Kluet, such as *De Standard*, *De Locomotive*, *De Corries*, and other newspapers. Apart from primary sources, this article also uses secondary sources. Secondary sources are the opposite of primary sources, which can be in the form of writings or objects that are not current, whether they come from the historical actor himself or other people. Secondary sources can be books and journals containing resistance events in Kluet (Miftahuddin, 2020).

The next stage is verification or criticism of the source. Generally, source criticism is carried out on the first sources. This criticism concerns source verification, namely testing the source's truth or accuracy (accuracy). There are two ways to verify or criticize historical sources: externally and internally (Sjamsuddin, 2016). One source of criticism was the political reports of the Acehese governor and the conquered regions during 1926-1927. This source was found to have been translated into Indonesian by the Aceh Documentation and Information Center, responsible for managing Dutch documents about Aceh. To test the validity of the source, this is done by asking who made the report and what the purpose of the report was. After verifying the report, it was found that a Dutch institution prepared the report to provide an official report on the political situation in Aceh in the period 1926 and 1927. At that time, Aceh was resistant. Verification of the report also involves the Aceh Documentation and Information Center, which manages the report, so that it can be ensured that the source is valid as a research reference.

The next stage is interpretation. Interpretation is a step in providing relationships between facts as evidence that these events have occurred in the past, associated with finding and proving relationships with each other, thus forming a factual and logical unity of the life of a group, society, and nation (Wardah, 2014). One of the interpretations made is that there was Dutch interference in transitioning the leadership of Keujereun Kluet from Teuku Raja Mukmin to Teuku Meurah Adam. This is based on the interpretation of two facts, namely the existence of a pledge letter between Keujereun Teuku Meurah Adam and the Tapaktuan Controller at that time, H.R. Jacobs in 1925, apart from the fact of the pledge letter, there are also notes in the political report of the Aceh governorate and its conquered areas during 1926 to 1927 which explained that there were Dutch efforts to maintain the authority of the new Keujereun. The interpretation of the influence of Keujereun Teuku Meurah Adam was reduced due to the leadership transition process, which was interfered with by the Dutch and was not liked by the public. Apart from that, the impact of the Sabil war saga on the resistance in Kluet is also an interpretation of the discovery of saga texts during Captain Haga's raid on Teuku Cut Ali's hideout in 1926.

The final stage is historiography, namely the activity stage of conveying the results of an imaginative reconstruction of the past according to its traces. In other words, the historiographic stage is the stage of writing activities, which results from interpreting the written facts into a harmonious historical story (Herlina, 2020). After completing it ultimately at each stage of their research, historians still have to think about strategies for conveying or communicating the results of their research so that they do not lose the meaning contained in the historical sources and evidence collected and interpreted. Writing historical research work is not enough just to summarize the research results and write the conclusions; you also have to pay attention to the style and strategy in conveying it so that readers can more easily understand and accept the research results (Daliman, 2015)

Result

One reason for the emergence of resistance was the dismissal of Teuku Raja Angkasah as a foreman for constructing water channels between Beutong and Rambong Villages. His dismissal was based on his protest because the weight of the work was not commensurate with the salary paid, plus delays in salary payments. Apart from that, Teuku Raja Angkasah also wanted revenge against Teuku Muhammad Nur, who was close to the Dutch. Teuku Muhammad Nur himself is one uleebalang Bakongan, who is also the adoptive father and nephew of Teuku Raja Angkasah, who has killed Teuku Raja Angkasah's father. There was also Dutch interference in the traditional government of Kluet by signing a Pledge Letter between Keujreun Kluet Teuku Meurah Adam and Controleur Tapak Tuan H.R Jacob. Apart from these three factors, there is also the Sabil War Story factor, proven by Captain Haga's ambush on the hiding place of Teuku Cut Ali and his troops. During the ambush, Teuku Cut Ali and his troops managed to escape but left behind the manuscripts of the stories of the Sabil War that they had. The saga contains a description of the pleasures in heaven, which will be received by people who have died in war against the infidels.

During 1925-1927, there were many battles between fighters and the Dutch. These fighters consisted of groups commanded by specific figures. Here are the leaders of the fighter groups:

Table 1. Fighters in the Kluet area and surrounding areas

No	Name	Died
1	Teuku Raja Angkasah	10 November 1925
2	Teuku Maulod	20 March 1926
3	Panglimo Rajo Lelo	3 April 1926
4	Teuku Nago	25 May 1927
5	Tgk. Puteh	1 July 1926
6	Nyak Aceh	18 July 1926
7	Teuku Cut Ali	25 May 1927
8	Imeum Sabi	25 May 1927
9	Teuku Itam	20 March 1926

During that year, several well-known Dutch officers also died in battle against groups of fighters, such as Lieutenant Molenaar and Captain J. Paris. Fighters carry out various unique strategies. The typical strategy was to carry out sudden ambushes using only kelewang and carbines captured by the Dutch from hidden places against the Dutch patrol troops or bivouacs as quickly as possible and disappearing back into the forest area. Apart from the strategies described previously, a unique plan is demonstrated by the Teungku Puteh group in Trumon. The fighters took advantage of the condition of the area overgrown with weeds and made it possible for the fighters not to be seen by the Dutch military ranks. The fighters were clever enough to dig holes in the weeds, which made the Dutch view of them undetectable, so they did not realize they had entered dangerous territory.

Discussion

The Dutch Process of Entering Kluet

After the second Dutch aggression under van Swieten, the Dutch managed to survive in Kutaraja and tried to establish their hegemony throughout the Aceh region. In the West Coast region of Aceh, the Dutch warships *Watergeousus* in April 1874, under Captain K.C. Bunnik, announced that they had conquered the Kingdom of Aceh. However, the ship's arrival did not get a good response from uleebalang along the South West Coast of Aceh (*Militaire Nota Over de Onderafdeling Tapatoean*, 1928). The Dutch arrived in Tapaktuan on May 5, 1874. Tapaktuan officials came to visit the ship. The Dutch sent Lieutenant M. Segov to submit a deed of recognition that the Dutch had controlled Aceh, but the deed of recognition was rejected. Meanwhile, the Dutch could not visit Kluet and Meukek because the waves made it impossible to land, and there was also an outbreak of cholera (Doup, 1980).

The Dutch again sent the Banda warship under the command of Lieutenant C.H.F. vans Woelderren in September 1874. The Banda ship's task was to try again to convince the people of

uleebalang in each state that the Dutch had conquered the Kingdom of Aceh, *Dalam* (the palace) had been burnt to the ground, and Sultan Mahmud Syah had died. The *uleebalangs* still did not respond to the Dutch on the pretext that they were fasting and were reluctant to come to the ship. The Dutch, who also wanted to move to the coast, were hampered by unfavorable weather factors, resulting in the warship's mission. The *band* still reaps failure. Subsequent Dutch actions were limited to shelling from the sea. The Dutch did not dare to engage in aggression against the area along the southwest coast of Aceh. The Dutch's introduction to these areas was limited to the coastline (*Militaire Nota Over de Onderafdeling Tapatoean*, 1928).

General J.B Van Heutsz, who was appointed later as Dutch Military Governor in Aceh, ordered First Lieutenant Hendrikus Colijn as the *Governing Official* (ruling officials) who were assigned to establish a new Dutch territory south of Meulaboh (Doup, 1980). Colijn left for Tapak Tuan on June 1, 1899, with 75 Bayonets, later increasing to 100 from Garrison One Infantry Battalion. Colijn arrived in Tapaktuan on June 3, and it became a historic day for the start of Dutch Colonialism in the South Aceh region at Kuala Krueng Seurula. Colijn oversees an area stretching from Kenegerian Kuala Batee to Kenegerian Trumon. Colijn was required to create order in the small kingdoms along the coast of South Aceh and strengthen Dutch relations with the *uleebalang-uleebalang* in each of these states (*Militaire Nota Over de Onderafdeling Tapatoean*, 1928).

The Background of the Emergence of the Match

During the Dutch occupation of the southern region of Aceh, the Dutch carried out various types of projects. These infrastructure development processes are H.N.A. Swart's political steps to control Aceh with peace politics, better known as pacification politics. These projects include the construction of water channels in Krueng Bakongan, the opening of a new road from Kutaraja to Trumon, and various other projects. The Netherlands employs local workers to implement these multiple projects. However, the Dutch treated the workers arbitrarily (*Nota van Toelichting Over de Landschappen Kloet En Troemon*, 1935). The pacification policy advocated by Swart did not work according to his expectations, and the practice in the field still saw arbitrariness by Dutch individuals themselves. Snouck Hurgronje has advised that residents who are asked to carry out forced labor should be within soft limits and not put too much of a burden on the residents. This arrogance can easily arouse hatred and delay the development of a government that has already started to stabilize. Workers who feel disappointed can rise again without fear of the power of military occupation (Gobbe & Adriaanse, 1990).

The difficulty of constructing water channels between Beutong and Rambong Villages was not commensurate with the salaries paid, plus delays in salary payments, which caused Teuku Raja Angkasah to become furious and protest against the Dutch attitude. The attitude shown by Teuku Raja Angkasah resulted in him being dismissed as foreman. The workers who also felt the misery of Dutch arbitrariness in the project were willing to join Teuku Raja Angkasah in resisting. One of the causes of resistance carried out by T.R. Angkasah was also based on a desire for revenge against Teuku Muhammad Nur. Teuku Muhammad Nur himself is one *uleebalang* Bakongan, who is also the adoptive father and nephew of Teuku Raja Angkasah, who has killed Teuku Raja Angkasah's father. Several years earlier, Teuku Raja Angkasah wanted to take revenge on his adoptive father, but Teuku Raja Angkasah failed to realize this intention.

Teuku Raja Angkasah was expelled by Teuku Muhammad Nur from Bakongan for some time because he anticipated Teuku Raja Angkasah's intentions towards him. However, Teuku Raja Angkasah, who wanted to live in his area, then apologized and took an oath of allegiance to Teuku Muhammad Nur so that Teuku Raja Angkasah was allowed to return to Bakongan and was entrusted with looking after one of the Dutch projects in building a bridge in Bakongan. However, Teuku Muhammad Nur did not believe in Teuku Raja Angkasah's good intentions. Therefore, he continued to monitor Teuku Raja Angkasah's movements closely. Teuku Muhammad Nur's good relationship with the Dutch made Teuku Raja Angkasah determined to fight against the Dutch, who always sided with Teuku Muhammad Nur (*Nota van Toelichting Over de Landschappen Kloet En Troemon*, 1935).

The intention to take revenge also became the basis for Teuku Cut Ali to fight back. Teuku Cut Ali had a strong sense of revenge against the Dutch, who had imprisoned and exiled his leader, Teuku Ben Mahmud. The opportunity that came through Teuku Worms Teuku Cut Ali took advantage of it in carrying out revenge against the Dutch colonialists. His close relationship as a friend with Teuku Raja

Angkasah also sparked Teuku Cut Ali's return to the battle arena against the Dutch (Muchsin, 2014). Kluet is an area in South Aceh Regency which is divided into four sub-districts, namely North Kluet Sub-district, Central Kluet Sub-district, South Kluet Sub-district and East Kluet Sub-district. Kluet can also be interpreted as one of the tribes that inhabit the area, but the Kluet area itself is not only inhabited by the Kluet Tribe but also the Aceh Tribe and the Aneuk Jamee Tribe. Kluet during the Dutch colonial period, Kluet had its own government system in the form of a state called Keujreun Kluet. Keujreun Kluet was led by a Keujreun.

Dutch intervention in Kluet itself began with the Dutch fighting against influential figures in the Kluet area. The Dutch started by spreading rumors that Teuku Raja Mukmin did not have the skills to lead the government. So the Dutch tried to enter the government and forced Teuku Meurah Adam, who at that time served as deputy, to okay Kluet to replace Teuku Raja Mukmin as its okay Kluet in 1925. This Dutch attitude made Teuku Meurah Adam have to make a Pledge Letter which was signed by Controleur Tapaktuan H.R Jacobs (Bukhari et al., 2008). Some decisions that later provoked the anger of the people, such as the dismissal of some *uleebalang cut* for no apparent reason by *it's okay, uleebalang cut*. It is no longer permissible to collect taxes which was previously the duty of Uleebalang Cut. Apart from that, Datuk Rajo Lelo also did not get his position as *imeumbalei*, which is his right because he has embezzled the tax money that he has quoted, position *imeumbalei* given to Raja Ameh, plus the allowance received by officials of five *imeumbalei*. Keuchik Benu Amin was also revoked (*Nota van Toelichting Over de Landschappen Kloeet En Troemon*, 1935).

Reading and listening to saga recitations is a special entertainment for Acehese people, so it has become a hobby among them. In the war stories in Aceh, it is stated that dying while fighting against the Dutch, who were considered *kaphe* (infidels) by the people of Aceh, was a martyr whose sins would be forgiven and included by Allah SWT in heaven and would receive all kinds of pleasures. In addition, the story of the Sabil War also teaches that participating in the Sabil War is *fardhu'ain*, meaning it is obligatory for all Muslims, both men, and women, young and old, even children (Alfian, 1992). The story of the Sabil War is not just an ordinary text but is also reflected as an anti-colonial ideology that was able to mobilize the strength of the colonized people to oppose colonialism. This ideology moves to become a bridge to form and unite anti-colonial power bases, which may be separated into one unified force, namely Islam. From an ideological point of view, the ideology of the sabil war exudes a hegemonic nature. This means that in the text of the saga, the sabil war played a role in giving rise to the opinion of the colonized people that the colonial war that the people of Aceh underwent was a war of the Muslims. The impact was to unify the separate anti-colonial elements into one strong unit to fight colonialism (Siahaan et al., 2021).

The impact of the Sabil War Story became increasingly apparent after Captain Haga ambushed the hiding place of Teuku Cut Ali and his troops. In this ambush, Teuku Cut Ali and his troops managed to escape but left behind the manuscripts of the stories of the Sabil War that they had. The saga that was found contains a description of the pleasures in heaven, which will be received by people who have died in war against the infidels. Captain Haga's discovery of these stories shows that the Sabil War Story was also one of the factors behind the emergence of intensive resistance against the Dutch colonialists in Kluet and its surroundings (Zentgraaff, 1983). Acehese fighters, both men and women, children and adults, can be stimulated by the lyrics of the Sabil war saga. Dutch military officials considered this very dangerous, believing that the Sabil War saga was responsible for their failure against Aceh. So, the Dutch decided to burn copies of the Sabil war saga if they found them so that Acehese fighters could not reread them (Octaviani, 2020).

New Reasons for the Emergence of Resistance in 1925

There were two reasons why physical resistance against the Dutch only peaked in 1925. Based on analysis of sources, two factors caused resistance to peak in Kluet only in 1925. **First**, there was Dutch intervention in the Kluet local government with the signing of the Pledge Letter between Teuku Meurah Adam and the then Controller Tapak Tuan H.R Jacobs, which led to the transition of leadership from Teuku Radja Mukmin to Teuku Meurah Adam in 1925 during the time of Governor A.M. Hans (1923-1926). The signing of the Letter of Pledge by Teuku Meurah Adam with the Dutch in 1925 was a fundamental fact of interference in the local government of Kluet. The Dutch had tried it before, but the firm attitude of Teuku Radja Mukmin made it difficult for the Dutch to expand their influence. The Dutch

interference in the local government caused divisions among the Keujreun, Uleebalang, Uleebalang Cut, village heads, and residents, so hatred grew towards the Dutch, which became the root of this problem.

The second is a mental problem. Zentgraaff (1983) said, "In the western coastal area of Aceh, the spirit and fighting spirit that is burning is the one that lasts the longest; there is always tension that is ready to explode at any time. The inhabitants may bow their heads when the great operations are carried out, but within themselves, they do not change at all." The fighting spirit within the people is still very significant and has never changed, but on the one hand, the people (fighters) have no way of doing it. A lighter is needed to foster a fighting spirit so that the hatred within the fighter can explode. The trigger figures were Teuku Raja Angkasah and his group, whose group carried out resistance, which was an individual problem, namely dismissal as a foreman on a Dutch project and also as an attempt to take revenge for the murder of his family. The success of Teuku Raja Angkasah and his group against the Wiarda brigade has changed the views of the fighters in the Kluet area and its surroundings. The assumption that the resistance could not be won saw that Teuku Ben Mahmud's fate in 1908 against the Dutch did not end well. However, this view suddenly changed after Teuku Raja Angkasah was able to mobilize his followers who were project workers who felt Dutch arbitrariness to fight back.

The Kluet People's Series of Resistance Against the Dutch Colonial Years 1925-1927

Teuku Raja Angkasah and his group, who were victims of Dutch abuse in carrying out the project, tried to organize a unified resistance force underground in Bakongan. However, the Dutch detected this movement on October 19, 1925. The news received was immediately taken seriously by the Dutch. Under the instructions of Brigade Lieutenant Wiarda, Sergeant van Wijk was appointed to investigate the serious problems that the Dutch would face. Precisely at 14.30 on October 22, 1925, Sergeant van Wijk arrived in Bakongan and tried to gather information regarding the fighter group led by Teuku Raja Angkasah. Feeling that the information about this group of fighters was sufficient, the Dutch rushed to patrol that evening at 22.00 WIB. The patrol was carried out from Bakongan, heading north towards Bukit Gadeng, and it was accompanied by soldiers from Kandang and a location guide ("De Brigade Wiarda Door Atjehers Omsingeld," 1925).

The Dutch brigade had quite difficulty finding the fighters' location. Dutch troops surrounded a house suspected of being a hiding place for the fighters, but when the Dutch tried to push in, nothing was found. The Dutch brigade then continued their journey. The guide saw a fighter approximately 10 meters away shortly after that. The man ran away quickly. Lieutenant Wiarda instructed him to chase but missed him. The beginning of the resistance in the Kenegerian Kluet area, precisely in Bakongan, occurred half an hour after the chase incident. The first sign of quite impressive resistance in the Bakongan area, followed by the surrounding regions, occurred on October 23, 1925. A group of warriors armed with kelewang jumped out from behind the dark trees shrouded in night. The ranks of the Dutch brigade led by Wiarda were in disarray and overwhelmed in anticipation of attacks from all sides, both front and rear and left and right. The Dutch movement Teuku Raja Angkasah and his followers had detected there, and they were quick to carry out a *surprise attack* towards the Netherlands. The Dutch received a hard blow from the attacks of the fighters because from the Dutch side, there two soldiers were killed, three soldiers were seriously injured, and seven people were slightly injured. Apart from losing several soldiers, the Dutch also lost 14 carbines. The loss of the carbine made the Dutch even more afraid because it would be used for the next series of resistance, which the Dutch did not know when and where (Doup, 1980).

After the attack from Teuku Raja Angkasah's group some time before. The Dutch, who took the resistance seriously, finally sent three Second Garrison Battalion Infantry Brigades from Kutaraja on October 26, 1925 under the leadership of Captain J. Paris. The brigade's patrol even received a response in the form of an attack from the fighters the day after their landing, precisely on October 27 1925. The patrol led by Captain J. Paris accompanied by Lieutenant W.A.M Molenaar received an attack from the fighters in Ujung Padang. This attack resulted in casualties from the Dutch side, with details of 1 person killed, namely Sergeant Ambon and 11 Dutch soldiers injured, while 11 people died from the fighters themselves ("Nieuwe Onlusten In Atjeh," 1925). The brigade sent by the Dutch from Kutaraja under the leadership of Captain J. Paris was not enough to stop the fighters' resistance. In response to several attacks on the Dutch, it was hoped that the Dutch would be able to quickly crush the Teuku Raja Angkasah group by increasing the number of soldiers. Two 4th Division Brigades and two Marsose 5th Division Brigades under the command of Captain M. Meihuizen arrive at Bakongan on October 30 1925,

to suppress the resistance which was getting bigger and wider. The arrival of Dutch troops from Kuta Raja was known by Teuku Raja Angkasah, and he mobilized 37 soldiers to block the Dutch brigade's line in the village Ujong Padang. The battle then occurred at around 08.00 in the morning when the Dutch troops were boarding the crossing rafts. This battle resulted in Dutch troops suffering losses with 11 of their troops suffering serious injuries and 5 with minor injuries (Qutni, 2013).

One of the great warriors with extraordinary courage, Teuku Raja Angkasah had to breathe his last breath at the hands of Dutch troops under the command of Lieutenant W.A.M Molenaar on November 10 1925, in a battle in the village of Ujong Padang. The battle took place in the morning. The Dutch troops suffered losses of 11 people seriously injured and five people slightly injured. Unfortunately, on the part of the fighter, Teuku Raja Angkasah died along with 3 of his followers. However, the real struggle was not over. The death of Teuku Raja Angkasah was the beginning of massive resistance, as a foundation stone for courage, which was later followed by other warrior figures in carrying out resistance against the Dutch colonialists who were very dictatorial in their land ("Uit Den Archipel Het Vervet In Atjeh : De Bende van Angkasah,," 1925). After the death of Teuku Raja Angkasah, the fighters' physical resistance stopped for a moment. The Dutch, who saw that the situation was starting to come under control, finally, in December 1925 withdrew their marching brigades to return to Kutaraja. Two infantry were left in Kandang to guard against the re-emergence of a wave of resistance. The withdrawal of the Marsose brigade was clearly a waste of time for the Dutch; the resistance was not entirely over and would only become more significant in the following years (Doup, 1980).

Precisely on March 1, 1926, a new group emerged, which surprisingly attacked the Netherlands. The group of fighters was led by Teuku Maulod who attacked a Dutch bivouac in Gunong Kapho village. Infantry Brigade troops set up the bivouac from Singkil under the leadership of Sergeant Grunefeld. The establishment of the bivouac did not consider the possibility of attacks by the fighters. This can be seen from the fence which was built haphazardly, plus the soldiers who served as pickets that night did not carry out their duties. A quite fatal mistake from the Netherlands. The fighter group consisted of approximately 30 people under the leadership of Teuku Maulod raided the bivouac at 11 p.m. The battle occurred very quickly, resulting in 10 Dutch casualties, including Sergeant Grunefeld and 2 forced laborers, 5 soldiers suffered serious injuries and 2 soldiers suffered light injuries, while 17 carbines along with 800 ammunition fell to the fighters led by Teuku Worms. From the fighters themselves, 2 people were killed and 4 people were injured. This victory marked the revival of the enthusiasm of the warriors who had stagnated after the death of Teuku Raja Angkasah ("De Overval In Atjeh : Zeventien Karabijnen Met 800 Patronen Verloren!," 1926). Responding to the events experienced by Dutch troops under the leadership of Sergeant Grunefeld Previously, the Dutch sent three Brigade 4 and three Brigade 5 Marsose 9 and arrived in Trumon on March 7 1926. The brigade sent immediately carried out patrols under the leadership of Captain L.A. Snell but did not reap results. Meanwhile, a patrol led by Lieutenant A.K Van Heerde on March 8 1926 was attacked by Teuku Cut Ali's troops in Alur Laton. The battle resulted in the Dutch patrol commander receiving injuries to his knees. Dutch efforts to approach the fighters were quite difficult, so several marsose took the initiative to surround and peek at the fighters' right flank. The fighters were not aware of the siege that the Marsose were trying to carry out, the Marsose managed to approach the fighters' right flank until they were only approximately 10 meters away and opened fire which surprised the fighters. However, the fighters with alacrity and quick reflexes immediately responded to the attack. This battle was able to cause Cut Ali himself to suffer injuries, but it was not enough to break his fighting spirit. The overwhelmed Dutch had to withdraw the remnants of their troops back to Bakongan and then to Trumon by boat. This fierce battle resulted in the fighters succeeding in causing 30 Dutch casualties and capturing 15 carbines (Doup, 1980).

Fighting occurred again, this time in Krueng Batee Village, Trumon on March 17 1926 between Dutch troops under the leadership of Captain L.A. Snell and a group of fighters under the leadership of Teuku Maulod. The fighters were quite persistent and fearless in fighting using carbines that had been captured from the Dutch during the attack on the Dutch bivouac in Gunong Kapho. The booty some time before and of course also with the kelewang weapon which is typical for warriors. The fighters opened fire incessantly which caused the courage of the Dutch soldiers to suddenly drop. However, the remnants of the Dutch troops still tried to defend themselves with their carbines. The battle resulted in a Dutch sergeant getting a knife cut in his head, because of the continuous flow of blood he could no longer see. But once again the warriors had to lose a leader who had amazing courage. Teuku Maulod and Teuku Itam was included in the list of 13 fighters who died in that battle. The Dutch themselves killed European

sergeant Sleewagen and 3 were injured. After Teuku Mauload death, the remaining forces were then taken over by Teuku Cut Ali. It then moved its position to Kluet district (Doup, 1980).

The atmosphere was increasingly tense and uncontrollable, the assumption that the area was quite safe and peaceful was contrary to Dutch indications. With the Dutch forced to send additional troops, Captain G.J.A van Eck was sent to Trumon with four brigades and Lieutenant W.A.M. Molenaar was assigned to leave Lhokoeson to go to Trumon ("De Overval In Atjeh : Het Oude Liejde," 1926). The increase in the number of Dutch troops in the Kluet area and its surroundings shows an indication of panic from the Dutch, the quality of the existing soldiers is doubtful in being able to quell the struggle movement which never subsides and shows trend enhancement. Attacks on the Dutch military by fighters became increasingly common. The Marsose 5th Division 9th Brigade patrol under the leadership of Captain J. Paris was suddenly attacked by Panglimo Rajo Lelo's group on April 3 1926 in Sapik Village. Fighters who used kelewangs were able to apply pressure from all sides to the Dutch patrol lines. The Dutch themselves suffered losses of 6 people killed, including the patrol commander, Captain J. Paris, and 12 marsoses were injured. Of the fighters, totaling 19 people had to die as national heroes. This battle is also known as the "Kelulum War" because it took place near the Kelulum tree, the twelve fighters were buried at the location near the event (Qutni, 2013).

After the attack on Captain Paris in Sapik Village, the Dutch received reports that in Simpang and Lada Rimba Villages 10-11 young men had disappeared, they were suspected of joining the Teungku Puteh group. On April 15 1926, there was an attack near Ujong Pulo Rayeuk against the Marsose Brigade led by Sergeant Pontoh accompanied by Infantry First Lieutenant A.E Batten who was assigned to guard the telephone installation in Sibadeh. A total of 11 of the 13 fighters died, while on the Dutch side there were 4 people who were seriously injured and 4 people who were slightly injured. On April 20, the Dutch received news that leprosy sufferers in Rantau Sialang had been persuaded by the Cut Ali group to join in the resistance (*Laporan Politik Gubernemen Aceh Dan Daerah Taklukannya Selama Tahun 1926-1927*, n.d.). Successive attacks by fighters against the Dutch became more and more intense, on April 24 1926 Lieutenant W.A.M. Molenaar conducted a joint patrol with 2 Marsose Brigades with the assistance of Lieutenant Dessawagie together with two Infantry Brigades from Tapak Tuan came into contact with a group of fighters near Krueng Kluet Village. Part of the group attacked one of the brigades with losses on the Dutch side, 1 fuselier was killed and 1 person was injured, while 9 people were killed on the fighter side (Doup, 1980).

Seeing the rise of resistance in the Kluet and Trumon areas, at the end of April 1926 the Dutch finally combined Kenegerian Kluet and Kenegerian Trumon, where previously Kluet itself had joined Tapak Tuan and Trumon had joined Singkil. The Dutch call this area *Onderafdeeling Zuidelijke Atjehsche Landschappen* or Subdivision of the landscapes of South Aceh and Bakongan was chosen as the seat of the division commander and was entrusted with civil administration duties. Captain H. Behrens was appointed as acting head of the area, as well as commander of the troops. The Dutch then spread their troops in several areas, namely 3 Marsose Brigades in Ladang Rimba (Trumon), 3 Marsose Brigades in Kandang (Kluet) and 3 Marsose Brigades in Bakongan. On this basis, the author included Trumon and Bakongan in research related to Kluet during the Dutch Colonial period (Doup, 1980). The match network has not yet shown trend decline, during May 1926 alone there were several events. Lieutenant H.J.M Klaar's incident in Lembang by Cut Ali's group on May 18, followed by May 29 in Pinto Rimba and May 31 in Keude Trumon. By May 1926, the number of members of the Teuku Cut Ali group reached 74 people, spread across 60 people in Kluet and 14 people in Bakongan. Meanwhile the Dutch under Captain Behrens had 250 marsose to secure the Kluet to Trumon area (*Laporan Politik Gubernemen Aceh Dan Daerah Taklukannya Selama Tahun 1926-1927*, n.d.); ("Een Interview Over Atjeh En de Berekenis Daarvan," 1926). The Trumon area also became hell for the Dutch, Teungku Puteh who took leadership in that area. He commanded several attacks, such as the attack on the Dutch bivouac in Ladang Rimba on June 11, followed by the battle in Naca Village on June 19 where Teungku Puteh was also unable to be captured. The fighters then withdrew to lure the Dutch out of their nest (bivouac), but the Dutch did not have the courage to come out so then Teungku Puteh sent letters of challenge to the Dutch but received no response from the Dutch (Doup, 1980).

Teungku Puteh, who was being targeted, continued to be chased by Dutch brigade patrols. Three Marsose Brigades led by Captain H. Behrens and assisted by Lieutenant A.E. Batten was involved in a battle in Krueng Luas (Trumon) on July 1 1926. The fighters under the leadership of Teungku Puteh and around 30 of his followers dug protective holes in the reeds. With the blazing spirit of martyrdom,

Teungku Puteh and a number of his followers attacked the Dutch Marsose Brigade. The battle made Tengku Puteh fell, but the resistance was not broken. His brother Nyak Aceh continued his struggle ("Het Verzet In Atjeh," 1926). Teuku Cut Ali again caused trouble for the Dutch, on July 12 1926 a patrol led by Lieutenant P.W.O Schreuders near le Mirah Village was attacked by his group. The Dutch, who were overwhelmed by the attacks, had to retreat and flee. The Netherlands itself suffered losses with 1 person killed and 3 people injured. For seven days the residents held celebrations in the village. There was an abundance of meat dishes, everyone gave donations and joined in the party to welcome the victory. After several attacks from Cut Ali, the Dutch then launched a fierce hunt for Cut Ali. However, he still survived for several months until 1927, even though his followers had scattered (Zentgraaff, 1983). After the death of Teungku Puteh, Nyak Aceh who was tasked with continuing the struggle had to breathe his last breath in the battle against the Dutch patrol led by Captain G.F.V Gosenson on July 18 1926. Nyak Aceh died 17 days after the death of Tengku Puteh. The death of Tengku Puteh seems to have had an influence on the psychology of Nyak Aceh and other fighters in Trumon. However, the struggle will still continue by the remaining fighters (Doup, 1980).

A patrol led by Captain H. Behrens assisted by Lieutenant W.A.M. Molenaar was attacked at night in Teurebangan on 10-11 August 1926. The incident occurred when the patrol commander was about to estimate residents' income tax. The Dutch considered the location where they set up their bivouac to be safe enough to occupy because it was surrounded by a fairly high fence plus security on several sides, but at 03.00 WIB the fighters tried to infiltrate and set up ladders to get over the fence, so fighting could not be avoided. The attack was led by Teuku Nago who killed 4 Dutch troops including officer Lieutenant W.A.M Molenaar ("Hoe Luitenant Molenaar Sneuvelde: Nachtelijke Besluiting van Het Bivak," 1926). Meanwhile Lieutenant A.J. Haga and two Marsose brigades on November 30 1926 in Bakongan found a fighter hideout on a very steep coral mountain, approximately 80 meters high. The Dutch had to climb up to carry out further inspections but the Dutch's attempts to climb to the top were repelled by the fighters by rolling stones from above. The fighters chose to leave the location. Lieutenant Haga, assisted by his men, managed to reach the top, but they failed to cause casualties from the fighters. At the hiding place of the group of fighters, namely the Teuku Cut Ali group, several manuscripts of the Sabil War Hikayat were found (Doup, 1980). The warrior's self-esteem was never lost as a result of the Dutch's arbitrary treatment. The territory has been controlled but not the people. The hatred towards infidels is still the same as before. The Dutch and their patrols must be alert at all times. It is hoped that intensive patrols can reduce this. The Kluet and Trumon areas became hell for the Dutch, during 1926 the Dutch suffered losses with 21 people killed including 2 officers and 58 injured including 4 officers on board (*De Arbeider : Socialistisch Weekblad Voor De Provincie Groningen*, 1927).

Patrol Lieutenant Haga in January they managed to meet 10 Cut Ali fighters, fighting could not be avoided. However, the Dutch did not get any results because their brigade commander did not have the skills to organize a capture strategy. Fighting occurred again on March 7 between Teuku Nago's group and Captain Gosenson's patrol near Alue Pineung, and then on March 22 a battle in Bakongan village between Lieutenant Haga's patrol and Commander Prang Sabi. Some of these battles had a serious impact on fighting morale which was increasingly decreasing. Seen during April 1927, Dutch patrols did not receive attacks from fighters (*Laporan Politik Gubernemen Aceh Dan Daerah Taklukannya Selama Tahun 1926-1927*, n.d.). The line of resistance seemed to have faded a little in 1927, this can be seen from the number of fighters who took the role of carrying out physical resistance against the Dutch. As of May 1927, only a few small groups remained, led by Cut Ali, Teuku Karim and Teuku Bugis, with only 32 people and only equipped with 2 carbines captured from Dutch soldiers. Meanwhile, in 1926, the number of members of the Teuku Cut Ali group reached 74 people and reached approximately 250 fighters if combined against all other small groups ("De Toestand Momenteel," 1927).

Suddenly in the middle of the night between 2-3 May 1927, the group of fighters under the leadership Meum Sabi carried out an attack on the 5th Brigade of Marsose's 6th Division which had set up bivouac in the Menggamat valley. Clever tactics on the part of the fighters succeeded in approaching the bivouac fence and then charging into it. The patrol commander, Lieutenant F. Harting, was immediately targeted by fighters who slashed at him, causing him to suffer injuries. Fortunately, several of his subordinates immediately helped, otherwise he would have been the next officer to fall victim to the intense resistance that occurred in the Kluet area and its surroundings. The fighters seemed very clever at protecting themselves from the Dutch klewang's slashes. They wear a kind of armor, namely clothes covered with cotton, while their heads are covered with at least two head coverings and very

little is visible from the outside. They also use cloth calf pads to protect their feet. Fortunately, most of the Dutch were able to survive using carbines. From this attack, 8 Marsose soldiers were injured ("Het Overvallen Bivak," 1927).

Teuku Cut Ali, who is a frightening threat to the Dutch, continues to be the main target. Captain Gosenson received information regarding the whereabouts of Teuku Cut Ali's group at 10.00 and immediately moved with Brigade 5, Division 6, Marsose, who was the best among the other divisions in the Kluet area before any trace of it disappeared. The Dutch arrived in the early hours of the morning at the location where the fighters were last seen. In fact, the Dutch are still having difficulty finding the location of Cut Ali, all they found were footprints. After approximately 1 day of searching for the whereabouts of Cut Ali's group, finally a makeshift hut which was Cut Ali's hiding place was found in Alur Beuberang or Krueng.Meukob or Lawe Mokap, the current Lawe Cimanok Village. The battle was inevitable, the Dutch, who were fully prepared for battle, took control, while Cut Ali and several of his followers had to survive with minimal equipment. May 25, 1927 became a dark day for a symbol of persistent resistance. The Marsose attack claimed casualties from the fighters, namely Cut Ali, the leader of the resistance, Teuku Nago, the main planner of the attack on the Teureubangan bivouac on August 11 1926 which killed Lieutenant Molenaar, Imeum Sabi, the planner of the attack on the Dutch bivouac led by Lieutenant Harting in Menggamat on the night of 2/3 May 1927 and two women, Teuku Cut Ali's wives. After the battle was over, Gosenson then took the men, totaling 110 people, to leave. to the place where the battle took place yesterday to identify the bodies of the fighters and bury them. Only Cut Ali will be taken and buried in Kandang ("Het Sneuvelen van Tjoet Ali," 1927). The death of these figures was bad news for a group that existed in the resistance from 1925 to 1927. After their deaths, these figures clearly had an influence on the resistance in Kluet, Trumon and Bakongan. After that day, no further major resistance was heard in the area. So it is only fitting that Hasan Tiro in his book WarAceh 1873-1927 marked the end of the Aceh war after the death of Teuku Cut Ali. After that, it must be admitted that attacks that can be seen directly as a struggle against colonialism are no longer as prominent as in the past. This is also further emphasized by the fact that the Netherlands has greatly reduced the deployment of military forces in government, and many dual military functions have been eliminated. *Civil Gezaghebber* which had previously been merged into the hands of the inner team commander *subdivision* it has been abolished and replaced with a civilian controller. The struggle has shifted from the gun board to the political chess board, the next generation has a different way of opposing colonialism. This was due, to a greater or lesser extent, to the awareness and direction of Acehnese intellectuals, both political and religious. The people of Aceh themselves joined in joining the youth oath in 1928 in which Aceh became part of one nation, one language and one flag and ultimately one country (Said, 1985).

Fighters' War Strategy Against Dutch Colonialism

Guerrilla warfare tactics are very closely related to the Indonesian people, because they were used when trying to defend the independence they had achieved. Guerrilla War was also developed as part of the Indonesian state's defense strategy in maintaining its existence from enemy attacks. The Universal People's Defense System has been established as a national defense strategy by adopting the Universal War Strategy in its implementation and Guerrilla warfare is the ultimate effort to provide resistance to every offensive action of a particular country (Tanjung, 2021). In the practice of war in the Kluet area and surrounding areas, the fighters fought using guerilla tactics. The word "guerilla" itself comes from Spanish "*guerillajas*" which means "horde" or "neatly arranged group". The battle pattern changed from previously involving all groups to shifting towards only small groups. These small groups are usually called *banden* "mob". The Guerrilla War itself is often carried out without the massive participation of the people, but their position cannot be separated from the people who inform the Dutch position to the fighters (Mateen, 1978). The guerrilla warfare tactics used by fighters in the Kluet area and surrounding areas were based on and adapted to several factors, namely topography, time and weapons. These factors are in sync with the guerrilla tactics used by the fighters. These factors will include:

Topography, topography itself is the contour of an area in an area. Areas on the north and east coast have different topography from areas on the south west coast. so that resistance patterns tend to be different. The eastern and northern regions have topography that tends to be flat so that battles will be more effectively carried out over long distances using rifles and donderbuses. This is different from the South West Coast region, where the area is covered by mountains and forests, so the war strategy used

will be slightly different. The typical strategy was to carry out sudden ambushes using only kelewangs and carbines captured by the Dutch from hidden places against Dutch patrol troops or bivouacs suddenly as quickly as possible and disappearing back into the forest area (Zentgraaff, 1983).

The strategy of moving into the forest area was carried out by almost all groups of fighters spread across several areas such as Trumon, Bakongan and Kluet. So it was difficult for the Dutch to detect the presence of the fighters and they carried out sudden attacks on Dutch military patrol lines or bivouacs set up by the Dutch. This sudden attack also contained unique strategies by each group of fighters. Not all groups apply these unique strategies, each group has unique and different strategies for each attack they carry out. Defensive strategies against possible ambushes by the Dutch against groups of fighters were also anticipated. The anticipatory steps taken by the fighters were in the form of moving places quickly. Taking advantage of the topography which tends to be filled with forests and mountains makes it easier for groups of fighters to move without being noticed by the Dutch. This can be seen in the Teuku Cut Ali group, at times they were in Trumon and carried out attacks on the Dutch and quickly moved to forest areas in the Kluet area and carried out an attack there. A strategy that made it difficult for the Dutch to face a series of resistance throughout 1925-1927 in the Kluet, Bakongan and Trumon areas. Apart from strategies like those described previously, there was also a unique strategy shown by the Tgk Puteh group in Trumon. The fighters took advantage of the condition of the area overgrown with weeds and made it possible for the fighters not to be seen by the Dutch military ranks. The fighters were clever enough to dig holes in the weeds which made the Dutch view of the fighters undetectable so that the Dutch did not realize that they had entered dangerous territory.

Time, the time referred to here refers to the change in contrast between day and night. Utilizing night time is a solution for close-range warfare. This can be seen from attacks by fighter groups such as the Teuku Maulod group, Teuku Raja Angkasah, Teuku Cut Ali, Imeum Sabi and Teuku Nago. This strategy was quite beneficial for the fighters, limited visibility made it easier for the fighters to sneak and approach the Dutch bivouacs. Apart from that, the Dutch troops, who were also mostly resting, were not always ready to face such a sudden attack. **Weapon**, the fighters only used the traditional weapons they had such as kelewang, swords and machetes. Meanwhile, the Dutch already had machine guns which of course really supported open combat at a certain distance. The use of traditional weapons by fighters is supported by the factors described previously, namely topography and time (night). Sometimes during the battle, the fighters managed to disarm the Dutch's carbine. This happened several times, such as 14 carbines which were captured by the Teuku Raja Angkasah group from a Dutch patrol under the leadership of Wiarda, the Teuku Maulod Group who managed to seize 16 carbines along with ammunition from the Netherlands under the control of Sergeant Grunefeld and several other disarmaments. The captured carbines were able to support the resistance strategy which had previously been supported by topography and had been adjusted to an effective attack time at night.

Conclusion

New resistance emerged in the Kluet area and surrounding areas in 1925-1927 when other areas had subsided based on two things, namely, Dutch interference in the Kluet local government with the signing of the Pledge Letter in 1925 which caused a good commotion in the ranks of Keujreun, uleebalang, uleebalang cut, village heads and civilians. Apart from that, it was also based on mental issues, namely, the fighting spirit that already existed within the fighters, which made the resistance started by Teuku Raja Angkasah which was successful and eventually followed by other groups. The psychology of the fighters who previously thought that resistance against the Dutch was impossible suddenly changed, groups of fighters bravely put up consistent resistance which overwhelmed the Dutch in crushing them. The fighters' strategy in resistance to the Dutch Colonials in Kluet and the surrounding area was basically a guerrilla warfare strategy. This guerrilla warfare strategy was supported by the topography of the Kluet area which was filled with forests and mountains, so that resistance was carried out by hiding in the forests and carrying out quick attacks and returning to the forests quickly. Apart from taking advantage of the topography, the fighters also took advantage of the night time conditions to fight back. This was also based on the weapons used, namely kelewang and machetes which might be used in close combat.

References

- Alfian, I. (1987). *Perang di Jalan Allah Perang Aceh 1873-1912*. Pustaka Sinar Harapan.
- Alfian, I. (1992). *Sastra Perang, Sebuah Pembicaraan Mengenai Hikayat Perang Sabil*. Balai Pustaka.
<http://archive.org/details/SastraPerangHikayatPrangSabi>
- Bukhari, et al. (2008). *Kluet Dalam Bayang-Bayang Sejarah*. Ikatan Kekeluargaan Masyarakat Kluet (IKMK).
- Daliman, A. (2015). *Metode Penelitian Sejarah*. Penerbit Ombak.
- De Arbeider: Socialistisch Weekblad Voor De Provincie Groningen*. (1927, Mei).
- De Brigade Wiarda Door Atjehers Omsingeld. (1925, Desember). *Het Centrum*.
- De Overval In Atjeh: Het Oude Liejde. (1926, March 8). *De Indische Courant*.
- De Overval In Atjeh: Zeventien Karabijnen Met 800 Patronen Verloren! (1926, March 5). *Het Nieuws Van Den Dag Voor Nederlandsch-Indië*.
- De Toestand Momenteel. (1927, March 23). *De Locomotief*.
- Doup, M. A. (1980). *Ikhtisar Sejarah Kependudukan Belanda di Tapak Tuan dan Daerah-Daerah Kenegerian di Bahagian Selatan Daerah Aceh*. Pusat Dokumentasi dan Informasi Aceh.
- Een Interview Over Atjeh en de Berekenis Daarvan. (1926, August 30). *De Nieuwe Vorstenlanden*.
- Gobbe, E., & Adriaanse, C. (1990). *Nasihat-Nasihat C. Snouck Hurgronje Semasa Kepegawaiannya Kepada Pemerintah Hindia Belanda 1889-1936*. Inis.
- Herlina, N. (2020). *Metode Sejarah (II)*. Satya Historika.
- Hermaliza, E. (2014). *Aceh "Pungoe": Karakter di Balik Istilah Provokatif*. Kementerian Pendidikan dan Kebudayaan, Direktur Jenderal Kebudayaan, Balai Pelestarian Nilai Budaya Aceh.
- Het Overvallen Bivak. (1927, Mei). *Algemeen Handelsblad Voor Nederlandsch Indie*.
- Het Sneuvelen van Tjoet Ali. (1927, June 20). *De Korier*.
- Het Verzet In Atjeh. (1926, July 7). *De Indische Courant*.
- Hoe Luitenant Molenaar Sneuvelde: Nachtelijke Besluiting van het Bivak. (1926, September 22). *Het Centrum*.
- Iryana, & Kawasati, R. (2019). *Teknik Pengumpulan Data Metode Kualitatif*. INA-Rxiv.
<https://doi.org/10.31227/osf.io/cy9de>
- Kuntowijoyo. (2018). *Pengantar Ilmu Sejarah*. Tiara Wacana.
- Laporan Politik Gubernemen Aceh dan Daerah Taklukannya Selama Tahun 1926-1927*. (n.d.). Pusat Dokumentasi dan Informasi Aceh.
- Mateen, K. V. D. (1978). *Watak Berperang Bangsa Indoenesia Berbagai-Bagai Daerah (Suatu Perbandingan)*. Pusat Dokumentasi dan Informasi Aceh.
- Miftahuddin. (2020). *Metodologi Penelitian Sejarah Lokal*. Uny Press.
- Militaire Nota Over de Onderafdeling Tapatoean*. (1928).
- Moleong, L. J. (2017). *Metodologi Penelitian Kualitatif*. PT Remaja Rosdakarya.
- Muchsin, M. A. (2014). *Trumon sebagai kerajaan berdaulat dan perlawanan terhadap kolonial Belanda di barat-selatan Aceh*. Kementerian Pendidikan dan Kebudayaan, Direktorat Jenderal Kebudayaan, Balai Pelestarian Nilai Budaya Banda Aceh.
- Nieuwe Onlusten In Atjeh. (1925, Oktober). *De Standaard*.
- Nota van Toelichting Over de Landschappen Kloeet en Troemon*. (1935).
- Octaviani, H. (2020). Tipologi Masyarakat Aceh Pada Perang Aceh- Belanda 1873-1942. *Universitas Islam Negeri Ar-Raniry*.
- Qutni, D. C. (2013). *Sejarah Perjuangan Bangsa Kita di Bahagian Barat Nusantara (1874- 1928) Daerah Aceh Selatan*. Mitra Gama Widya.
- Said, M. (1985). *Aceh Sepanjang Abad*. PT Harian Waspada.
- Siahaan, S., Hendra, A., & Midhio, I. W. (2021). Strategi Perang Semesta Dalam Perang Aceh (1873-1912). *Jurnal Inovasi Penelitian*, 1(11), Article 11. <https://doi.org/10.47492/jip.v1i11.517>

- Sjamsuddin, H. (2016). *Metodologi Sejarah*. Ombak.
- Tanjung, A. (2021). Kajian Literatur: Penerapan Strategi Perang Semesta Dalam Perang Asimetris Yang Dilakukan Oleh Indonesia. *Strategi Perang Semesta*, 7(2), Article 2. <https://doi.org/10.56555/sps.v7i2.685>
- Uit Den Archipel Het Vervet In Atjeh: De Bende van Angkasah. (1925, November 12). *De Locomotief*.
- Veer, P. V. 't. (1985). *Perang Aceh: Kisah Kegagalan Snouck Hurgronje*. PT Grafiti Pers.
- Wardah, E. S. (2014). Metode Penelitian Sejarah. *Tsaqofah*, 12(2), 163–175.
- Zed, M. (2014). *Metode Penelitian Kepustakaan*. Yayasan Pustaka Obor Indonesia.
- Zentgraaff, H. (1983). *Aceh*. Departemen Pendidikan dan Kebudayaan Direktorat Sejarah dan Nilai Tradisional.