

Abdul Haris Nasution's Contributions to Indonesian Military and Politics: 1955-1959

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Abstract

This article is a historical study that discusses Abdul Haris Nasution from a political perspective. This research explores Abdul Haris Nasution's career journey and his contributions to the Indonesian military and politics from 1955 to 1959. This study uses historical methods with steps, namely heuristic, verification, interpretation, and historiography. The historical sources used are primary sources, including the Chiefs Staff of mandate in the Republic of Indonesia, Instructions of the Central Warlord, The Mimbar Indonesia, and Nasution's writing books. Secondary sources from the results of previous research, which became the basis of Nasution's thought on the military and politics, such as Abdul Haris Nasution's role in the "Bandung Lautan Api" incident in 1945–1946 and Abdul Haris Nasution's role in the liberation of West Irian, 1957–1962. The results of this research show that Nasution's career in the military field was very bright, starting with joining the Reserve Officers Corps (CORO). On October 17, 1952, Nasution resigned from the Chief of Staff of the Army (KSAD) position and returned to active service in the military in 1955. Nasution contributed to the military field in 1955–1959 to formulate ideal civil-military relations in Indonesia and the "middle way" army concept. Nasution's contribution to the political field in 1955–1959 re-implemented the 1945 Constitution. Nasution encouraged President Soekarno to issue a presidential decree as the beginning of guided democracy.

Keywords

Abdul Haris Nasution, Indonesian Military, Politics

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Introduction

The study of politics and the military is exciting and vital to discuss because the military is one of the institutions that often influences a country's political stability. Indonesia's military history has a close relationship with state affairs. The army was born as a response to the outbreak of a people's revolution to seize and maintain independence (Putro, 2018). Military organizations are needed by the state, both in the context of war to expel enemies and in efforts to maintain the sovereignty and dignity of the Indonesian nation (Supriyatmono, 1994). The military's involvement in the political context occurred in Indonesia for a certain period, as reinforced by the opinion of Muhaimin (1982), who stated that the military had different political movements in each period. Muhaimin's statement aligns with the idea of Sundhaussen (1986), which says that transitory has a dominant role in Indonesian politics, especially after the independence revolution. Furthermore, Perlmutter (2000) argues that the military has an excellent opportunity to enter affairs outside the defence and security functions when there is political instability in a country. While Nurkhasanah (2013) states that the military will not interfere in politics if the ruler has strong legitimacy, it will intervene if political uncertainty is caused by weak leadership.

In the 1950s, parliamentary democracy was implemented in Indonesia (Nasution, 2018; Mukti, 2020; Silitonga, 2021; Fitria et al., 2023). Political instability often occurs in this period due to upheaval in various regions, conflicts between political parties, rapid cabinet changes, economic crises, and moral crises among civil leaders (Setiawan et al., 2018; Dimas & Marjono, 2021; Affan et al., 2023). The 1950 UUDS as the legal basis for parliamentary democracy is considered unable to provide legal certainty and guidelines for good governance (Ma'arif, 1985; Arta, 2020; Fitria et al., 2023; Suwignyo & Yuliantri, 2023). The constituent assembly, mandated to draft a new law, has not formulated a legal basis within the specified time limit (Setiawan et al., 2018; Salahudin & Amin, 2021). Several military figures attempted to provide alternative ideas to overcome the chaos of the 1950s when civilian politicians could not offer solutions that could defuse the conflict (Said, 2006). Crouch (1986) added that expanding the military's role beyond the defence and security function in the 1950s was not a planned process but a spontaneous reaction to various conflicts. Instinctively, the military group seeks a more strategic position than other state institutions. Muhaimin (1982) stated that it was natural for the military to want to contribute more to state policymaking because it had enormously contributed during the Indonesian independence revolution. During Dutch Military Aggression I and II, the military could make quick decisions and dare to risk their lives for the sake of state sovereignty if the results of diplomacy were detrimental to the Indonesian people (Nasution, 1982; Sundhaussen, 1986).

There are many figures in the Indonesian military whose actions can be studied. However, Abdul Haris Nasution is a character who needs more attention because he can become a soldier and a thinker. Nasution was one of the many military officers who contributed ideas to overcoming Indonesia's political crisis (Nurhikmi et al., 2020). Nasution is a fascinating figure to study because he has held strategic positions in the military and government for several periods (Irma et al., 2022). Nasution is considered the father of the TNI-AD because he was instrumental in pioneering the professionalism of the Indonesian military (Turner, 2005). Anwar (2018) added that Nasution was the formulator of the army's "Middle Way" concept as legitimacy for expanding the Indonesian military's role in the New Order era. Through his writings, Nasution played an extended role in Indonesian history as a historical actor and thinker. He held critical military positions such as Commander of the Siliwangi Division (1946–1947), Deputy Commander-in-Chief (1948–1949), Chief of Staff of the Army (1949–1952, 1955–1959), Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces (1959–1962), Minister of Defense and Security (1962–1966). Meanwhile, his position in government was Chairman of the MPRS (1966–1972), which dismissed President Soekarno and appointed Suharto as President of Indonesia. Amid his busy schedule, Nasution also wrote books on military and political themes. At the end of his life, Nasution received the title of General five stars in 1997 as a state honour for his services to Indonesia (PDAT, 1998).

Research on Nasution's character already existed by Irma et al. (2022), entitled *Analysis of Abdul Haris Nasution's Character Values as a Source for Learning History*. This article only discusses Nasution's characteristics that Indonesian students can emulate, such as responsibility, willingness to sacrifice, sincerity, and prioritizing the interests of the country above personal interests. Nasution was a religious soldier who lived a simple life despite serving as the top military leader. However, this article only reveals a little about Nasution's actions. Other research, such as in the Indonesian military and political fields, is necessary, so it is essential to carry out new research in different aspects. Other studies, such as Makruf (2019) entitled *The Role of Abdul Haris Nasution in the Bandung Lautan Api Incident 1945–1946*, show readers that the young Nasution was already a soldier who contributed to the Indonesian revolution. As the leader of the Siliwangi Division, Nasution dared to risk burning the city of Bandung as a war strategy. Subsequent research by Nurhikmi et al. (2020) with the title *Abdul Haris Nasution's Role in the Liberation of West Irian 1957–1962* reveals the military actions carried out by Nasution as leader of the Joint Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces (KSAB) and the Minister of Defense–Security instructed to immediately reclaim West Irian into the Unitary

State of the Republic of Indonesia (NKRI) according to the results of the *Konferensi Meja Bundar* (KMB). Both studies examine the character of Abdul Haris Nasution only as a warfighter without touching on political aspects, especially thoughts about the state and government systems. This can lead readers' opinions to conclude that Nasution was just a fighting soldier, even though he was also an organizer, writer, and thinker who made an essential contribution to the development of Indonesia's military and politics.

This article attempts to update the research to complete and strengthen the discussion of Nasution's figure from a political perspective without ignoring his military instincts. This article also attempts to dismiss the significant role of civilian politicians in the transition of the Indonesian government system but excludes the military's role in it. This article focuses on the period 1955–1959, which was a transition from parliamentary democracy to guided democracy. This is confirmed by the opinion of Supriyatmono (1994), who places Abdul Haris Nasution as a critical military figure actively involved in the political constellation of the 1950s. This article will show the contribution of Nasution's thoughts, which were able to change the position of the military through politics and the Indonesian government system in the 1955–1959 period.

Research Methods

This research uses the historical method. Wasino & Hartatik (2018) stated that historical research has unique characteristics that are different from other social-humanities research. Abdurrahman (2011) added that the historical process contains systematic steps to collect various historical sources effectively, assess them critically, and analyze and synthesize the results found in written form. The historical research method has several stages, namely: (1) heuristics, which is collecting sources from the past; (2) criticism, which is investigating past sources from an internal and external point of view; and (3) interpretation, which is interpreting the facts obtained objectively; and (4) historiography, that is expressing the synthesis results obtained in written form. The data sources used in the research are primary data sources, namely various mass media from the same era (*Harian Merdeka* and *Duta Masyarakat*), the Mandate of the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the Republic of Indonesia, The Central Warlord Instructions, and an autobiographical book written by Abdul Haris Nasution himself to describe the events he experienced, such as *Memoirs of Memenuhi Panggilan Tugas* Volumes I, II, III, and IV. Meanwhile, secondary sources come from books such as *Military and Politics in Indonesian* (Crouch, 1986), *Nasution, Dual Functions of ABRI, and Contributions to Political Reformation* (Supriyatmono, 1994b). Relevant research is taken from the latest journals, such as the research on *Dual Functions of ABRI: Tracing the History of ABRI's Involvement in Indonesian Socio-Political and Economic Life* (Anwar, 2018), *Abdul Haris Nasution's Role in the Liberation of West Irian 1957–1962* (Nurhikmi et al., 2020), *General Abdul Haris Nasution in the Incident of 17 Oktober 1952* (Fatturahman et al., 2018) and others.

After the data sources have been collected, the next step is source criticism, which includes external and internal criticism (Abdurrahman, 2011). External criticism examines the authenticity of physical historical sources, namely whether the various primary documents and newspapers obtained by researchers are authentic or fake. Meanwhile, internal criticism compares multiple sources to see how they align with the studied research topic. In this article, the researcher compares the alignment between primary and secondary sources, with possible results including agreeing, agreeing, supporting, or contradicting. The next stage is historical interpretation, namely interpreting various historical references considered qualified to produce historical facts (Gottschalk, 2008). The last is historiography, namely writing the analysis and synthesis results honestly and logically with due observance of the guidelines for systematic scientific writing. This article was written by separating the results of research and discussion. The study results are in the form of exposure to facts obtained from primary and secondary sources. Writing is presented descriptively and chronologically according to the steps of the historical method. While the discussion describes the results of analyzing the facts obtained, they are combined with other social science approaches such as law, politics, and psychology. The researcher also conveys his research to produce original and quality historical articles. The discussion section seeks to provide a new perspective on Indonesian political and military history.

Result

Abdul Haris Nasution's career journey in the military field

Abdul Haris Nasution was born on 3 December 1918, in Hutapungkut Village, Mandailing District, South Tapanuli, North Sumatra. Nasution began to enter elementary education, namely Holland Inlandsche School (HIS), which is at the same level as Elementary School (SD) in Kotanopan. In 1932, Nasution graduated from HIS education and was accepted as a student at the "Teacher School" or Hollandsche Indische Kweekschool (HIK). Nasution took the *Algemene Middelbare School* (AMS) exam to get a diploma equivalent to a general high school (SMU) (Nasution, 2018). Nasution graduated from Teachers' College in Bandung in 1938 and then returned to Sumatra to become a teacher in the Bengkulu. Nasution did not stay in Bengkulu for long because he was transferred to Muara Dua to fill a

vacancy as a school principal. Nasution decided to end his career in education and enter military school because he felt bored working as an employee (Nasution, 1982). In 1940, the Netherlands opened a school for reserve officers, the Corps Opleiding Reserve Officieren (CORO), as a Koninklijk Nederlands-Indische Leger (KNIL) branch. Nasution strongly desired to enter the military with the capital of an AMS education diploma to participate in the CORO education selection in Palembang. After completing his military education, Nasution migrated to Bandung to work as a municipal employee and served as the leader of the Youth Front and Deputy Commander of the Pioneer Front Battalion from 1943 to 1945 (Nasution, 1982).

Nasution's meaningful career in the military field began when he became Commander of Division III of the People's Security Army (TKR) based in Bandung in 1946. At that time, allied troops under AFNEI came to Bandung to disarm the Japanese army, and a battle occurred with Division III of TKR, assisted by the people. Nasution took the initiative to burn down the city of Bandung when the situation was already an emergency. This burning incident is known as the Bandung Lautan Api (Nasution, 1983). During the Second Dutch Military Aggression in 1947 and 1948 (Putro, 2018), Nasution served as Commander of the Javanese Territorial Army (PTTD) and Deputy Commander in Chief (Wapangsar) of General Soedirman, with his office called the Javanese Command Headquarters (MBKD). Nasution took the initiative to form a military government in Java because there was a vacuum of power in the civil government (Nasution, 1983). During the liberal democracy era, the Wilopo cabinet issued a policy of reducing the military budget in response to the 1952 economic crisis (Nasution, 1984). Mukti (2020) added that the parliamentary democracy during the Wilopo cabinet experienced a budget deficit because the need for imports increased while the prices of Indonesian export goods decreased. At that time, Nasution served as Army Chief of Staff (KSAD) and was forced to reorganize and rationalize the TNI by reducing the number of soldiers (Nasution, 1984).

The economic crisis that occurred had an impact on the political turmoil. The peak of this political crisis was that on October 17 1952, there was a mass demonstration supported by the TNI-AD to demand the dissolution of parliament. Still, it was dissolved by President Soekarno (Hari Merdeka, November 26 1952). Nasution (1984), in his memoirs, admitted that the Army did not intend to carry out a coup against the legitimate government but only tried to warn parliament not to interfere in the Army's internal affairs. As a consequence of the fact that what was planned did not match the impact of this incident, Nasution was willing to resign from military service. After leaving, Nasution was still concerned about the military's condition, conveying the following "I pay close attention to what you have to say. I completely understand your difficulties. I warn you, like when I had a dialogue with the late Mr. Dirman. I ordered the army not to be swayed by politics. What I said to the demonstrators also applies to you. I ask you to maintain public order" (Nasution, 1984, p. 164).

Abdul Haris Nasution's thought contribution to the military from 1955-1959

The idea of reinstating Nasution received broad support, especially from forces outside the TNI-AD. Nasution's name was popular during the war for independence and the TNI's consolidation. Nasution was declared inactive from the military because he was involved in the problems of October 17, 1952. Most support came from political parties with nationalist and Islamic ideologies. Within the TNI-AD itself, many supported Nasution, especially from the "contra October 17" group, while the "pro-October 17" group did the opposite. Abdul Haris Nasution wanted to be appointed by the president to return to the position of Army Chief of Staff (KSAD) because he was interested in his political views. Responding to this offer, Nasution (1984, p. 306) said the following:

"Especially during my two and a half years as Army Chief of Staff and during my ten years of experience in the TNI, I feel that the army, especially its leaders, will still be tossed around if there is not enough or there is no basis for work in the form of laws and certain military politics which are the basis for the steel. Our organization, forces, and operations are for solving everyday problems. Because of that, since quitting as army leader, I have been trying to find ways at the political level to create the foundations because this matter lies above the Army level."



Figure 1. Nasution's inauguration as Army Chief of Staff by President Soekarno in 1955

(Source Arsip Perpusnas RI, <https://perpusnas.go.id>)

After receiving back the position of Army Chief of Staff, Nasution thought that the first step the military had to achieve in the mid-1950s was to replace the TNI's identity as a "warrior army," namely the legality of the military's position in state life. The TNI must position itself as the "spearhead of the national struggle," which, together with other potentials, plays a role in making political policies. Nasution believes that the reorganization of TNI by revamping its structure and transferring officers' assignments is urgently needed. A series of reforms were carried out, including ratifying several laws concerning militias, regular soldiers, veterans, retirees, conscription, and defence (Nasution, 1984). Based on Army Chief of Staff Order No. SP-330/8/1956, dated August 6 1956, shifts in the duties of strategic officers were carried out, among others, within the ranks of the Army General Staff (SUAD), the Army Chief of Staff's High Leadership Council, and the Army and Territory Commanders. Turner (2005) added that, although there were opinions for and against within the Army, the reorganization and shift program in the TNI-AD institution had been realized in early 1956. The impact of this program was that the heads of the Territorial Army (TT) and the soldiers were under one commander's command, so the Army became more solid.

Another of Nasution's thoughts on the military is related to the military's position in politics. Karl von Clausewitz was a Prussian war general and military strategist who inspired Nasution (Nasution, 1984). Clausewitz in Howard (1991) added that war is not only a form of military activity and has a military dimension but is also a continuation of the political policies of the authorities. War is political, so politics and the military are only formally separated. Nasution argues that Clausewitz's theory only applies to Western countries and is less relevant to Eastern countries. The political reality in Indonesia is miscommunication between the civilian government and military leaders, namely the tendency to infiltrate or interfere in each other's internal affairs. According to party politicians in parliament, the military is considered an organization that can threaten their political rights (Ma'arif, 1985; David & Christopher, 2013). Responding to this, Nasution (1984), in his memoirs, emphasized that he did not want the military to be established as an exclusive group and preferred the establishment of good political communication between civilians and the military. Researchers agree with Nasution that the Indonesian state needs understanding and agreement between state institutions to realize a good government.

The 1950s and 1958 saw military coups in developing countries such as Thailand, Burma, Pakistan, and Iraq (Firdaus, 2021). Discussions at the National Council turned into conversations about the possibility of a military coup in Indonesia, which was spearheaded by Nasution (Duta Masyarakat, 22 Oktober 1958). Nasution used various military coups abroad as momentum to open up the army's "political will." Nasution's conception was conveyed at the Anniversary of the National Military Academy (AMN) in Magelang on November 11 1958, which was called "The Army's Middle Way" (Majalah Editor No. 2/Years. VI). Nasution, in his memoir, emphasized that the Indonesian army had no intention of emulating events in several Latin American countries, where the military played a political role by dominating and monopolizing power. It was also emphasized that the Indonesian military could not follow the Western European model, where the army only took a passive role or was an institution obedient to the civilian government. The Indonesian military does not want just to be a tool for one party to "legitimize power" (Nasution, 1984).

Abdul Haris Nasution's thought contribution to the politics 1955-1959

Nasution criticized the parliamentary system of government that has been implemented in Indonesia since 1950. In the parliamentary system, political parties are the dominant element in determining government policy. Nasution, in his memoirs, believes that there are still differences in political orientation between military groups and party politicians. The shift towards a parliamentary system based on the 1950 UUDS has violated the ideals of the proclamation of August 17 1945, and the 1945 Constitution, so it can be said to be a "historical accident". Nasution, in his memoirs, believes that the 1945 Constitution contains the consequences of the birth of a presidential system,

that is, positions of the head of state and the head of government are held by one president, so that it can better guarantee the creation of political stability. The 1945 Constitution is more in line with Indonesian political culture, providing opportunities for various forces to make government decisions (Nasution, 1984).

At the end 1958, guided democracy received the most interesting discussion in the National Council. National Council members worked hard to create political formulations that underlie the implementation of guided democracy (Luluq et al., 2021). An exceptional staff was formed, namely the Guided Democracy Formulation Committee (PPDT), whose task was to formulate the steps to realize guided democracy, including issues of its constitutional basis (Turner, 2005). The successful conception was developed at the 9th National Council meeting on August 14–15, 1958. Regarding the results of the decision, Nasution (1984) stated that the formulation of guided democracy could be carried out and implemented in the 1945 Constitution. Nasution, as a member of the National Council, hoped that the constituents could produce a fundamental law following the ideals of the proclamation of 17 August 1945 (Rinardi, 2017).



Figure 2. Nasution attended the meeting with the agenda of returning to the UUD 1945
(Source: Memenuhi Panggilan Tugas Jilid IV: Masa Pancaroba kedua, 1984).

The open talk between the National Council and the Cabinet occurred thrice. In the first meeting held at the Bogor Palace, the cabinet unanimously declared its support for guided democracy. It approved the National Council's proposal regarding the need for functional groups to be included in the parliament (Lev, 2009). The second open talk was held at the State Palace, which resulted in a decision regarding the mechanism of functional groups in the DPR. The third empty talk was held at the Bogor Palace on January 26 1959. The decision adopted became known as the "Piagam Bogor," which discussed the legal basis of guided democracy (Crouch, 1986). All parties in the cabinet have not agreed upon the army's proposal to return to the 1945 Constitution. According to Nasution in his memoir (1984) the Karya Cabinet, on behalf of the government, requested permission to hold an internal meeting without the participation of other groups. The trial, which was held in Jakarta from 18 to February 19 1959, produced essential decisions, including (1) the '45 Constitution was a "historical document" containing the revolution for independence; (2) the '45 Constitution was by the personality of the Indonesian nation; (3) the '45 better guarantees the implementation of guided democracy; (4) the UUD '45 guarantees more political stability because it limits five years of holding office; (5) elements of functional groups can be included in the DPR, MPR, and DPA; (6) the content contained in the '45 Constitution is maintained; and (7) To approach the desires of the Islamic group, it is recognized "Piagam Jakarta" (Supriyatmono, 1994b).

The cabinet decided to re-implement the constitutional legal basis of the 1945 Constitution with the following procedures: (1) after there was a memorandum of agreement between the president and the council of ministers, the government took the initiative to hold a constituent assembly plenary session; (2) the president on behalf of the government urged the constituent assembly to determine a return to the 1945 Constitution; (3) if this recommendation is accepted, it will ratify the charter signed by the president, ministers, and constituents; (4) With the adoption of the '45 Constitution as the fundamental law, the Prfundamentalnt will regain government power; (5) The Karya Cabinet prepares a draft law (RUU) on parties and elections, and (6) after the election is over, a bill will be submitted to the DPR regarding the formation of the MPR and DPA, which will include functional groups (Supriyatmono, 1994; Lev, 2009).



Figure 3. The atmosphere awaits the reading of the Dekrit Presiden 5 Juli 1959
(Source: 30 Tahun Indonesia Merdeka, 1975)

After receiving pressure from the cabinet and parliament, the Constituent Assembly held a series of sessions to make a final decision on the 1945 Constitution. The Constituent Assembly was held between April and May 1959 (Mimbar Indonesia, 25 February 1959). Constituent decisions always face obstacles because they collide with issues related to ideology. Members of the Islamic Party try to hinder the quorum process (Haikal, 2019). Facing developments in the Constituent Assembly that showed stagnation, Nasution (1984) stated in his memoirs that he had recalled all commanders and war rulers throughout Indonesia to hold a conference. The issue discussed is the action that the military must take as a commitment to solving political problems. Nasution and the TNI-AD were at the forefront of seizing the initiative to take essential steps to save the country. Nasution temporarily banned political activities in Indonesia, which was stated in Regulation No. Prt/Peperpu/040/1959 as an effort to maintain order during the discussion of the Constitution. Nasution (1984) explained that this prohibition was taken because conversations about the '45 Constitution in the Constituent Assembly had turned into political competition endangering the country.

Discussion

Information about Abdul Haris Nasution's biography from birth to his youth, written by himself in the memoir "Memenuhi Panggilan Tugas Jilid I," is in line with research results from Makruf (2019) and Irma et al. (2022) who also said that Nasution was willing to go abroad to get a formal education and had become a teacher. Then Nasution's reasons for entering military education were also in line with the PDAT (1998), which added that Nasution witnessed the suffering of the people due to Dutch colonialism and wanted to play a more prominent role in the struggle for Indonesian independence through the military. If we examine Nasution's military education, it can be seen that Nasution received military education from the Netherlands in a European military style. This is supported by the results of a study by Supriyatmono (1994), which stated that the military education that Nasution received came from the Dutch army school, namely KNIL, not from the Japanese military school (PETA), as received by other military figures, for example, General Soedirman. The differences in military schools received by soldiers result in differences in leadership styles among several Indonesian military formations, which can trigger disagreements when problems arise.

Nasution had a significant role during the independence revolution. When he was Commander of the Siliwangi Division, Nasution took steps to set fire to the city of Bandung, which later became known as Bandung Lautan Api. Regarding the reason for the burning of the city of Bandung by Nasution, Makruf (2019) explained that to prevent the city of Bandung from being controlled by the enemy and to confuse the allied troops, they were easily defeated Cribb (2001) and McElhatton (2008) stated that Nasution was the originator of the guerrilla war strategy, namely fighting the Dutch by going in and out of the forest with the help of the people as a supporting force. The guerrilla war strategy, if examined from a military perspective, was capable of causing trouble for the Dutch troops, making it difficult for them to subdue the Indonesian troops who were fighting in secret. The economic crisis that hit Indonesia in the early 1950s impacted the political situation, namely the conflict between parliament and the military, which led to October 17 1952. The expansion of this conflict was natural because, from an economic perspective, it was stated that the financial problems experienced by a country could affect stability in other fields. Mass media news and Nasution's confession regarding the October 17 incident received the attention of Fatturahman et al. (2018) and Dimas et al. (2021), who criticize that the events of October 17 1952, were preceded by a lack of understanding among members of the military regarding civil-military relations, which resulted in internal divisions among TNI-AD officers and a bold

attempt to surround the parliament building. Nasution decided to resign from the position of Chief of Staff as a form of responsibility as the leader of the Army.

Nasution used the downtime to review military and political issues. From a psychological perspective, someone no longer burdened with busy work activities has a perfect opportunity to evaluate themselves and conduct personal research on problems around them. Nasution became more accessible to observe government and military corps deficiencies. Nasution views that the history of the TNI's struggle from the period of independence to the events of October 17 1952, can provide an essential lesson for the TNI's subsequent effort. During his inactivity, Nasution expressed his thoughts in books with military and political themes, such as *Guerrilla Principles*, *About the Indonesian War of Independence*, which consists of eleven volumes, *Notes on Indonesian Military Politics*, and *The Indonesian National Army*. Nasution initiated the establishment of the Indonesian Independence Supporters Association (IPKI) to fight for the re-implementation of the 1945 Constitution and the values of the proclamation. Regarding Nasution's inactive period, Arta (2020) and Irma et al. (2022) analyzed that even though Nasution was no longer active in the military, he still cared about the condition of the country, which was increasingly far from the ideals of the proclamation—Nasution's inactive period produced various new thoughts, either in the form of ideas or in written form, which would later be very important for the development of a professional Indonesian military organization.

Nasution returned to serve as Army Chief of Staff in 1955 because the president was considered to have brilliant ideas and a strong attitude toward nationalism. Nasution had the idea to reform the military organization, starting from within the military. In the process of improving the military, Supriyatmono (1994) analyzed that the shift in tasks by Nasution was aimed at placing officers according to their areas of expertise and demanding soldiers for one command under Nasution's policies. Then, the law reform was meant to create a more professional military organization. If you take a closer look, this is an excellent opportunity for Nasution to actualize his ideas during his inactive period. Based on the results of Nasution's reorganization policy analysis, it can be seen that Nasution was aware that a shift in the commander would cause an explosive atmosphere within the ranks of the TNI-AD. The change in leadership is not a decision but a deliberation process with the General Staff of the Army (SUAD), consultation with the government, and dialogue with relevant officers. According to Muhaimin's (1982), analysis, the reorganization aimed to make the Army's position more compact and more robust in dealing with problems from within and outside. Problems from within mean threats from several officers who try to build a counterforce to the KSAD, while problems from outside are threats from other national powers that try to undermine the authority of the Armed Forces. Another important consideration is that Nasution wanted to eliminate access to paternalism or primordial attitudes, namely the relationship between regional leaders and their subordinate leaders, who protect each other and try to cover each other's shortcomings. This gives him a strong position as commander in the region, so he tends to act as a warlord. Everything is directed at creating openness in the organization, namely a team that is compact, effective, and loyal to the centre.

Nasution's idea to focus on overcoming the internal problems of the military organization showed that he wanted to uphold the principles of legality and make the military struggle oriented towards the legal constitution of the country. This follows the opinion of military experts, namely Perlmutter (2000), who state that the military must ensure that its internal conditions are solid before entering politics. Internal consolidation is a prerequisite before determining a military position that can intersect with other institutions. Nasution's success in consolidating the strength of the Army was able to place the TNI-AD as the most reckoned component in Indonesian politics in the following period. In the mid-1950s, in several Asian countries, there were many government coups by military groups, which made politicians worried that they would spread to Indonesia. In response to this, Anwar (2018) explained that Nasution wanted to get rid of the issue of a military coup by issuing a statement that between himself and President Soekarno and Prime Minister Juanda as "key figures," there was always mutual understanding and always the same thoughts in dealing with Indonesia's growing political stability increasingly complex. However, Nasution was keen to see international conditions, thus conveying the position desired by the Indonesian military through the speech "The Middle Way of the Army."

The value contained in the concept of military politics conveyed by Nasution is that it explains the army's political will by considering the interests of other forces, such as Soekarno and political parties. President Soekarno did not want too much political participation from the army, even though he agreed to military involvement in politics. On various occasions, such as during the implementation of the war emergency, around the formation of the National Front for the Liberation of West Irian (FNPIB), and at National Council sessions, Soekarno always touched on the political issue of the Indonesian military so that it would not act against the law and the legitimate government. Nasution coined the Middle Way of the Army and can be seen as the forerunner of the ABRI Dwifungsi concept, practically practised in the New Order era (Dimas et al., 2021). The Indonesian military does not only function as an organization that guarantees national defence and security; it must also take on a role as a socio-political force that other parties must recognize. Based on this reference, military officers can occupy strategic civilian positions such as

governor, minister of the state, director general, and so on. In the end, Nasution's conception of the "Army Middle Way" received support from various parties (Sundhaussen, 1986).

Nasution criticized the parliamentary system of government and the law used, namely the UUDS 1950. According to (Suwignyo & Yuliantri, 2023), the parliamentary system is not to the personality of the Indonesian nation, which emphasizes the nature of family and deliberation. This was based on the fact that the parliamentary system gave rise to political instability in the form of frequent cabinet changes, which caused immediate crises and led to various rebellions against the government in the regions (Setiawan et al., 2018). Nasution's critical attitude towards the parliamentary system reflects "military complaints" because it does not provide space for soldiers to participate in state administration. The political parties that occupy parliament are considered to often "dictate to the army" and intervene politically in internal problems of the military corps. The civil-military dichotomy is getting stronger, so civilian politicians are trying to create effective control over military groups (David et al., 2013).

Nasution's opinion about returning to the 1945 Constitution as the legal basis for the state is, in fact, precisely in line with the ideals and goals of the state when the founding fathers of the Indonesian state compiled it. Based on legal government, the form of the Indonesian state that was used in the 1950s, parliamentary democracy only imitated the political system of Western countries, which worsened the country's stability. The '45 Constitution is more in line with Indonesia's political culture, providing opportunities for various forces to make government decisions (Rinardi, 2017). Then, based on studies in governance science, a guided democracy system should be implemented according to the framework of the 1945 Constitution as the legal basis for a new government system. Guided democracy will not run according to the ideals of the proclamation if it still maintains the 1950 Constitution as the legal basis for the state.

Nasution sought other support outside the National Council forum, namely from the president and the TNI-AD corps. Support from President Soekarno is significant because he is the head of state whose position cannot be replaced by anyone. Soekarno's voice could influence decisions taken by various parties, including party politicians. Gili & Dini (2017) and Ilmar (2018) agree with Nasution's opinion about seeking support from outside soldiers because the military must receive approval from other institutions to accelerate political reform. In the 1950s, there were only two major powers: Sukarno as head of state and Nasution as military leader. If these two figures unite, their ideas will likely be realized (Nurkhasanah, 2013). Nasution's success in obtaining the support of President Soekarno and Prime Minister Juanda encouraged him to re-locate to the National Council (Himawan, 2016). The vote cast by the Guided Democracy Drafting Committee confirmed that it approved the idea of returning to the 1945 Constitution. The National Council had no further reason to refuse, so it agreed and immediately conveyed the decision to the cabinet. A series of meetings were held between the National Council and the Karya Cabinet in an open forum. PNI was the first party to express approval because it was close to President Soekarno. Meanwhile, the Islamic parties, NU and Masyumi, were the ones that were the slowest to say their agreement. According to Indriyani & Purnomo (2023), Masyumi is still fighting for laws based on Islamic law, although in the end, they also agreed to return to the UUD in 1945.

Admittedly, the re-enactment of the 1945 Constitution with a Dekrit Presiden 5 Juli 1959 has strengthened the positions of the two political forces, namely Soekarno as the leader of the state and Nasution as the military leader. The 1945 Constitution was the meeting point for both ideas to save the country and enact political reform in all fields. The 1945 Constitution can provide a legal-constitutional basis for the president and the military to dominate state political activities. This is to the theory of a democratic state by Ma'arif in Himawan (2016), which states that a guided government system allows the president to be the sole ruler in the executive. Still, on the legal basis of the 1945 Constitution, it can remove the issue of "dictator Soekarno" and "junta military" in Indonesia.

Conclusion

Abdul Haris Nasution's career journey in the military field can be considered exceptionally brilliant despite ups and downs. Abdul Haris Nasution contributed his thoughts to the Indonesian military and politics. Nasution's contribution to the military was restructuring the military internally as a professional organization. Another of Nasution's ideas was to formulate ideal civil-military relations for Indonesia, namely, not wanting the military's position and role to be under civilian politicians' control. Nasution delivered a "soldier's middle path" speech in which he stated that the Indonesian military was not willing to be used as a tool by the authorities but did not attempt a coup or form its government. Contributions of thought to the Indonesian political sector include that Nasution disagreed with the parliamentary system of government because it did not suit the original personality of the Indonesian people. The UUDS '50 cannot be used as the basis for the state constitution, so it is necessary to re-validate the UUD '45. Nasution had the idea to issue a decree by the president containing a return to the 1945 Constitution to expedite the government transition. Then, it is also deemed necessary to form a stable government, namely the presidential model of government. This decree became known as the Dekrit Presiden 5 Juli 1959 and marked the beginning of an era of guided democracy with a presidential style. Ultimately, the constitutional institutions approved Abdul Haris Nasution's

thoughts on changes to the Indonesian military and government systems. In the following period, Indonesia used a guided democratic government system that placed Soekarno as the leader of the state and government and was supported by Nasution as military leader.

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